This article addresses the question of how the financial and economic crisis that hit the US in the late 2000s impacted immigration policies. We find that the crisis has not significantly changed dynamics. Instead, it has highlighted and aggravated persisting trends. Drawing on Kingdon's multiple streams model and combining it with the notion of two-level games, we find that while the policy stream and the problem stream would call for both restrictive and liberalising changes, the political stream impedes change: The fact that Congress has been divided for a long time over Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) impedes any restrictive or liberalising changes. With problems resulting from current policies being intensified through the global economic crisis, however, actors favouring either restrictive or liberal policy change look for alternative venues to pursue their policy aims. Through legislative changes on the state level or via executive orders by the president, policies can be changed on a lower level without CIR.
which led to the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies (Hatton and Williamson 2009 ). Yet at the same time, a crisis also makes more pronounced the hardships of undocumented immigrants that have no access to social benefits and thus suffer significantly when losing their occupation. Increased restriction of labour migration, moreover, can lead to migrants seeking access via humanitarian channels for refugee protection or family reunification (Czaika and De Haas 2013) .
The recent crisis has been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression by the International Monetary Fund (The Guardian, 10 April, 2008) and can thus be expected to have significantly impacted immigration policies in the US, as the US was hit particularly hard by the crisis (Huffington Post, 21 June, 2012; The Atlantic, 20 March, 2013) . We find that while there is no policy change induced by Congress, substantive changes at the state levels and through presidential Executive Orders can be observed. While policy change is blocked through deadlock in Congress, pressures from their constituencies for either liberal or restrictive changes encourage politicians to search for alternative venues to realise their policy aims. Actors interviewed for this study substantiate the claim that the crisis had an accelerating impact on policy change at levels other than Congress. We argue that this situation can be explained based on a combination of both venue-shopping as introduced by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and the multiple streams model suggested by Kingdon (1995) .
While both the policy stream (i.e. policy ideas that are present among politicians and experts) and the problem stream (i.e. the non-functionality of the current immigration system) would call for change, the political situation of deadlock in Congress impedes change. The reason for impeded change is that both actors with liberal preferences and actors with restrictive preferences present in the Congress rather have incentives for defection than cooperation on the issue matter, as defection results in more favourable policy outcomes for each of them.
They are more willing to accept the absence of the policy change they desire than they are willing to adopt changes to the status quo based on the policy preferences of their adversaries.
Thus, proponents of restrictive change, such as political actors from (mainly Republican governed) US states that are affected disproportionately by undocumented immigration, foster restrictive change on the local level and adopt policy aiming at immigration control enforcement that has so far been blocked in Congress (Steil and Vasi 2014; Jones and Chou 2014) . In contrast, examples for liberal change are the executive orders launched by President Obama aiming at temporary relief from deportation as well as the right to apply for work permits for certain undocumented immigrants.
With this study we aim to contribute to the wider debate on whether external shocks entail either restrictive or liberalising policy change. Our core finding is that while external shocks create pressures for change, these pressures need to be taken up by political actors in order to be transformed into actual policy change. Where change does not happen, pressures for change look for alternative venues and entail a politicisation of the issue. This study is based on an analysis of literature as well as policy documents on a number of decisions that have been made in the immigration policy area in the US between 2008 and 2012. In addition, we conducted 15 interviews in Fall 2012, at the height of the economic crisis, in which collective actors, such as unions and employers, but also politicians and experts from think tanks, elaborated on what they considered viable policies in times of crisis.
Multiple Streams and Venue-Shopping as a theoretical framework to study policy change in times of crisis
We aim at explaining the impact of the crisis on US immigration policies by drawing on Kingdon's multiple streams approach and combining it with the venue-shopping theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) . According to Kingdon (1995) , policy change can be explained by a convergence of the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream.
Analogously, the lack of change is based on an absence of this convergence. In line with Kingdon, the problem stream means the issue or the policy problem to be addressed. The policy stream covers the policy ideas that aim at its solution. The politics stream is the institutional setting and the political actors involved. In this article, we argue that the absence of a political stream favourable to change can account for the policy deadlock that we observe in US immigration politics in Congress. Moreover, we argue that the absence of such a favourable political stream can be best explained by drawing on the deadlock game in game theory. Following this model, non-cooperation is most beneficial to all actors involved, both individually and collectively, which eventually leads to policy stasis. Yet, given the immense pressures for change by their constituencies, which were amplified through the economic crisis, we argue that proponents of change look for alternative venues to pursue their aims.
Thus, we contribute to the empirically rich body of literature on policy stasis in the US (Mansbridge and Martin 2013; McCarthy 2007) by adding an as of yet missing theoretical explanation for this state of affairs.
According to the multiple streams model, the policy stream concerns policy ideas that are constantly around in what Kingdon calls the ʻpolicy primeval soupʼ (Kingdon 1995, 116 be policy responses to tackle problems. The policy ideas thus are solutions which they can sell to decision-makers. Yet, crucial events are needed for these policy ideas to get noticed and gain political weight (Kingdon 1995, 113) . In fact, dissent about the number, nature and national origin of desirable immigration is a constant feature of the US debate (Zolberg 2008 (Zolberg [2006 ). At the same time, immigrants are depicted as ʻvillainous invadersʼ and ʻheroic foundersʼ (Newton 2008, 1) . Thus, a crisis entailing a rise in numbers of unemployment can arguably help promoters of restriction of immigration gain ground (Newton 2008, 60) . These could use the event to argue for a cut in immigration to ensure a stronger protection of national workers. Simultaneously, a crisis highlights the hardship undergone by undocumented immigrants as their socio-structural position makes them especially vulnerable to economic slumps (Tilly 2011; Papademetriou and Terrazas 2010 ). Yet, to implement restrictive or liberalising policy changes, the political stream has to come in as well. The political stream comprises things such as ʻthe public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administrationʼ (Kingdon 1995, 145) . For instance, it has been argued that the increasing number of Latino voters puts pressure on the Democrats to introduce liberalising changes for the legalisation of their as of yet 'illegal' family and friends. In 2005, 84% of the Latino population supported the legalisation through the so-called 'path to citizenship' (Suro 2005, 10) . We assert that it is particularly the political stream which impedes change in Congress through deadlock. According to game theory, actors involved in a deadlock game benefit rather from defection than from cooperation. In this sense the game is a zero sum game. Each actor would benefit most in case of their own defection and the cooperation of the other actor.
Yet, the second best outcome for actors would be that both of them defect. The least beneficial outcome for either of them would be obviously their own cooperation and the defection of the other actor. Thus, an outcome where both of them defect is highly likely.
However, with the crisis, the problem stream that supports the preferences of proponents of both liberal and restrictive change swells and their policy ideas face a rising demand with the electorate, at least in some highly affected states (Fetzer 2006 (Fetzer 2006; Milner and Tingley 2008) . Democrats, on the other hand, have stronger preferences for the legalisation of undocumented immigrants (Lopez and Minushkin 2008, Boyer 2012, 2-3) .
We argue that the situation of deadlock in Congress in combination with the crisis makes policy-makers particularly susceptible to the dynamics of venue-shopping. While US policy-makers have already passed immigration policies in alternative venues before the beginning of the crisis, we argue that dynamics of venue-shopping in this area have intensified with the crisis.
Republicans searched for venues where they did not encounter liberal veto players. The
Democrats could circumvent restrictive veto players through presidential Executive Orders, which the president was able to pass without any interference of the opposing party in Congress. How the crisis promoted this search for alternative venues can be shown by applying the multiple stream model to US immigration politics.
The Problem Stream: An ineffective immigration system in times of economic crisis
The US immigration system in the 2010s is widely acknowledged as dysfunctional. Not only has President Obama characterised the system as ʻbrokenʼ 3 , but there is also consensus in scholarly debates that the current status quo is ʻbad for migrants, employers and the national interestʼ (Martin 2011a, 24) . This is especially due to high hurdles immigrants face. Unless someone has family-ties to US citizens, it is quite difficult to immigrate to the US. Visa streams for high-and low-skilled immigrants are criticised as they are overly complex and do not match business demands adequately (Hansen 2009, 11-13; Hanson 2009, 4) . In addition, a large number of undocumented immigrants entered the country in the past two decades, of which some moved to states that did not previously have experiences with immigration (Schain 2012, 210-215, 104 Stat.
4978, §205
). In addition, the IIRIRA combined greater border enforcement with a cut in social security benefits for immigrants (i.e. Social Security Federal public benefits, 110, Stat.
3009; see also Newton 2008, 53-63) . Moreover, the IIRIRA enabled ʻlocal and state police
[…] to enforce federal immigration lawʼ (Varsanyi 2010, 2) under provision 287(g). This is remarkable paradigm shift since immigration enforcement was an exclusive federal competence with states having ʻvirtually no role in the construction or enforcement of immigration lawʼ (Wishnie 2002, 285) 6 . Nevertheless, IRCA was unsuccessful in diminishing the inflow of undocumented migrants and the Immigration Act of 1990 played its part in increasing the complexity of the immigration system (Schain 2012, 213; Martin 2011b, 80) .
Not surprisingly, the widely acknowledged problems of the current US immigration policies also influence public opinion. The Pew Research Center (2013, 2) found that 75% of the respondents see the need for at least major changes in the US immigration system. More precisely, the same survey observed that while three-fourths of the respondents want a possibility for undocumented immigrants to stay legally (73%) and think that the government can do more to reduce undocumented immigration (a lot more: 53%; somewhat more: 30%), there is little consensus on whether to increase or reduce legal immigration (increase: 25%, decrease: 36%).
In sum, the 'problem stream' of US immigration policies is that the immigration system is considered dysfunctional by the majority of policy-makers involved. Both proponents of restriction (e.g. in the areas of border protection or family immigration) and liberalisation (e.g.
concerning legalisation of immigrants already in the country or supporters of increased immigration by labour) do not benefit from the system as it is. In the following section we will show that while all actors agreed that the immigration system needed to be reformed, the policy ideas to fix the broken system varied significantly between the actors.
The Policy Stream: Ideas for the reform of an ineffective immigration policy
This section demonstrates that the comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) comprises a set of major ideas for reinvigorating the effectiveness of US immigration policy. According to 6 In this regard the IIRIRA can be seen as a prerequisite to devolution in the field of immigration policies. Additionally, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (both in 1996) were part of this development. While the PRWORA cut down legal immigrants' eligibility for social services (i.e. Food Stamps, Medicaid) and ʻdevolved authority over select social services to the statesʼ (Varsanyi 2010, 2) , the latter ʻgave local police the authority to arrest previously deported noncitizen felonsʼ (Varsanyi 2010; Wishnie 2002 ).
Kingdon, policy ideas need to be on the floor already for actors to take them up and translate them into policy change. We will show how actors' preferences either coincided or collided with the CIR in times of economic crisis. Against the background of the picture drawn in the previous section, CIR -including border enforcement, regularisation of the undocumented and a guest worker scheme -becomes a compelling solution to the problems of the US immigration system. Since the 2000s, various forms of CIR have been debated in the US (for a history of proposed CIRs cf. Rosenblum 2011). Moreover, two presidents supported a CIR, although until now with little effect (Hanson 2009, 3) . 'Comprehensive immigration reform' not only entails the promise of fixing an ineffective immigration policy, but also insinuates that actors would be more willing to agree on a package deal rather than individual policy.
Comprehensiveness means that every major stakeholder's primary interest would be achieved, while at the same time the adoption of all policies would entail compromises on actors'
positions (Freeman 2009, 65-69; Rosenblum 2011, 10-13) . Put differently, every stakeholder receives something, while having to give in on other issues. CIRs in the past entailed -in different compositions -ʻincreased enforcement, a guest worker scheme and a path to legalizationʼ (Freeman 2009, 69; Rosenblum 2011, 1) . These three elements of immigration reform are key areas of US immigration policy. A CIR would tackle all of these policy areas.
First, the call for increased enforcement touches upon border control, primarily at the southern US border, and stepping up internal control measures by means of ID and status checks at the work place (ʻE-verifyʼ) as well as in public places. Second, the expansion of guest worker schemes is meant to broaden the legal channel for the temporal demand for low-and highlyskilled labour. Such measures accommodate the demands of industry and business for a steady supply of labour. Third, with legalisation the estimated ten to twelve million undocumented migrants in the US would be getting the opportunity to legalise their status.
Interestingly, points that are also debated, namely the significance of family reunification or the problem of visa overstaying, do not expand into proposals for a CIR. The rationale of a CIR is to get the approval of all stakeholders by implementing parts of their agenda and making 'package deals' (Marquez and Witte 2009, 3) . Accordingly, actors worried by the level of undocumented immigration should be won for the reform by the plan to step up border control and internal enforcement. Amnesty on a broad scale could win the consent of unions and civil rights groups traditionally concerned with measures protecting people from exploitation. Employers' interest in labour supply is met by the offer of temporary labour migration programmes (Freeman 2009, 65-69; Rosenblum 2011, 10-13) .
In 2012 the slim chance for an agreement on this package deal disappeared in light of the economic crisis. 7 The research on actors that promoted either legalisation of undocumented immigrants or temporary labour migration for skilled and unskilled workers felt that they had In the next section, we will demonstrate that the politics stream was not favourable for substantive policy change on the federal level. While the crisis increased pressure for change, it further politicised the issue and clearly separated the policy streams from one another. Studying actors' divisiveness over a comprehensive immigration reform, Martin (2011a, 25) holds that the status quo ʻis the second-best option for those who cannot achieve their first-choice solutionʼ as ʻmost unauthorised migrants get the higher wage jobs they seek and most employers get work done cheaper with such migrantsʼ (Martin 2011a, 17) 10 . Therefore, he observes ʻtalk but no actionʼ (Martin 2011a, 32) in times of crisis. We contest this argument and show in the next sections how actors searched for alternative venues to bring about change in immigration policy.
In Search of New Venues: Immigration control at the state level and executive orders by the president
The politics stream impeded change on the federal level due to the institutional setting and the divisiveness of actor positions which were emphasised by the crisis. Yet the problem stream became more prominent in recent years, especially but not only through the crisis and highlighted the need for policy change. This pressure hence led stakeholders to look for other venues to pursue their policy aims in which they would face fewer veto players.
Therefore, we find the claim that US politics were completely unable to produce legislative change to be slightly inaccurate. Change can be observed, albeit not on the federal level. Immigration policy-making shifts to the US states as well as to the president (Varsanyi 2010) 11 . Against the procedural rules that are laid down in the Constitution, the ʻstates take Forum 2012). In addition, anti-immigrant ordinances issued by municipalities (local level) are constantly on the rise since the failures of Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Steil and Vasi 2014, 1110; Varsanyi 2010, 11; Gilbert 2009 ).
Since the late nineteenth century, immigration policy-making has laid in the hands of the federal government. Only recently ʻstate and local immigration policy activism has explodedʼ (Varsanyi 2010, 9 (Varsanyi 2010, 2) . 12 However, state and local actors did not use these newly created channels immediately at the time of establishment (Varsanyi 2010) . Varsanyi (2010, 11) argues that politicians became more active on the state and local levels to ʻearn political capital on the issue of immigration reformʼ. Only the repeated failures to reform the immigration system ʻopened a veritable Pandora's Box of state and local immigration control initiatives seeking to fill the policy voidʼ (Cornelius 2010: vii) . Case in points are the 287(g) agreements between the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies (ICE) and local enforcement partners (police), which are by now in place in 17 states (ICE 2014; Coleman 2012) , municipalities and city ordinances (Steil and Vasi 2014; Varsanyi 2008) . In terms of party politics, scholars showed that Republicans are critical of the effectiveness of federal measures for immigration enforcement and push for devolution to the state level. In contrast, Democrats are opposed to state government attempts to take on immigration enforcement (Jones and Chou 2014; Fennelly, Pearson and Hackett 2015, 1423) .
Another example for a shift in venues are executive orders adopted by the president.
These orders supersede majorities in the Congress and again highlight the inability of Enforcement was not on their agenda and the temporary immigration of workers was heavily contested. Accordingly, the president maintained the status quo and opted for a piecemeal approach on legalisation. Observers from the left deemed this approach as the only way forward in a deadlocked Congress (Interview Change to Win, AFL-CIO, AILA, ACLU 2012).
In sum, the absence of policy change on the federal level intensified the problem stream, especially in times of economic crisis. Pressures for change therefore made their way to other venues. Republicans were able to enforce restrictive measures on border protection via the state and local levels, whereas Democrats could implement legalisation schemes through presidential decrees.
Conclusion
This paper set out to answer the question of what the impact of the economic and financial crisis is on immigration policies in the United States, a country that has been hit hard by this crisis. We find that the crisis has highlighted policy problems that have been present before and has aggravated these problems. US immigration policies have been described as ʻbad for migrants, employers and the national interestʼ (Martin 2011a, 24 ). Yet, a CIR is stuck in The contribution of this article is twofold. On the one hand, we have theorised the current situations of deadlock on the CIR and policy change on the state levels, which have been widely discussed but so far not comprehensively explained. We demonstrate that combining the theoretical approaches of venue-shopping and multiple streams is particularly helpful to understand policy-making under deadlock, as the problem and policy streams would call for change but the politics stream impedes it and so actors search for other venues to pursue their policy aims. This also applies to other policy areas on which the US Congress is currently faced with deadlock. In the case of the EU others have argued that restrictivelyminded ministers of the interior have engaged in 'bottom-up' venue-shopping, i.e. they have changed from the national to the EU level to pursue their policy aims (Guiraudon 2000; Maurer and Parkes 2007) . Our study adds to this that venue-shopping is not a one-way process, but can also imply 'top-down' venue-shopping and a search for adequate venues on a lower, i.e. subnational level. This seems to be part of a larger phenomenon. Examples for a trend towards devolution of immigration control and enforcement to subnational venues can be found in other federal political systems. More competences for local and regional entities are also claimed in Canada, Spain, the UK, and other countries (Thränhardt 2013) . In which way the economic crisis intensified claims for devolution in other cases has yet to be researched.
On the other hand, we show that the crisis has rather aggravated or highlighted problems that have been present for a long time. Thus, the crisis cannot be considered to be the root of current policy change, but rather a moderating variable amplifying the problem pressure that entailed change. This leads us to conclude that external shocks like the global economic crisis never have an immediate impact and are never critical junctures per se but that these rather need to be translated into policy change by political actors. 
